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WHAT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SHOULD APPLY TO
THE WORKER ADJUSTMENT AND RETRAINING
NOTIFICATION ACT?
PETER J. MIGNONE
INTRODUCTION
The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988
("WARN") 1 requires an employer2 planning a plant closing3 or mass
layoff' to give the employees' union (or each affected employee indi-
vidually if no union exists) and the state dislocated worker unit6 at
least sixty calendar days notice of such action. 7 In enacting this stat-
ute, Congress intended to buffer the economic, emotional, and physi-
cal stress that workers experience after unexpectedly losing their
jobs.8 WARN attempts to address these problems by providing a
short period of transition so that the affected employees can adjust to
the impending unemployment, seek new employment, and, if neces-
sary, learn a new skill.9 To enforce this obligation, Congress created a
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988).
2. "[Tlhe term 'employer' means any business enterprise that employs-
(A) 100 or more employees, excluding part-time employees; or
(B) 100 or more employees who in the aggregate work at least 4,000 hours
per week (exclusive of hours of overtime) .... " Id. § 2101(a)(1).
3. [T]he term 'plant closing' means the permanent or temporary shutdown
of a single site of employment, or one or more facilities or operating units
within a single site of employment, if the shutdown results in an employment
loss at the single site of employment during any 30-day period for 50 or more
employees excluding any part-time employees ....
Id. § 2101(a)(2).
4. [T he term 'mass layoff' means a reduction in force which -
(A) is not the result of a plant closing;, and
(B) results in an employment loss at the single site of employment
during any 30-day period for -
V)(I) at least 33 percent of the employees (excluding any part-
time employees); and
(1") at least 50 employees (excluding any part-time employees);
or
(ii) at least 500 employees (excluding any part-time employees)
Id. § 2101(a)(3).
5. "[T]he term 'affected employees' means employees who may reasonably be
expected to experience an employment loss as a consequence of a proposed plant
closing or mass layoff by their employer.. . ." Id. § 2101(a) (5).
6. Under the Employment and Training Assistance for Dislocated Workers Act,
Congress required each state to establish a "dislocated worker unit" to provide rapid
delivery of federal services to assist displaced workers. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1653
(1988), as amended by 29 U.S.C. §§ 1661-1662 (1988).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (1988).
8. See Richard XV. McHugh, Fair Warning or Foul? An Analysis of the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act in Practice, 14 Berkeley J. Empl. & Lab.
L. 1, 4-5 (1993).
9. 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(a) (1994).
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private right of action allowing WARN victims to recover back pay
and benefits for each day they are deprived of notice, up to a maxi-
mum of sixty days. 10 These victims may commence WARN suits in
federal courts in any district where the alleged violation occurred or
where the employer transacts business.' Unfortunately, Congress
failed to supply this right with a statute of limitations.12
In cases where Congress neglected to prescribe a statute of limita-
tions for a statutory right, federal courts generally borrow the period
from state law.' 3 The Supreme Court, however, has recognized an ex-
ception to this general rule.'4 Courts may borrow a limitations period
from federal law when "a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly
provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the
federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that
rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmak-
ing."15 Four Courts of Appeals have addressed this issue concerning
WARN claims. The Second and Third Circuits concluded in favor of
state-borrowing,' 6 whereas the Fifth and Sixth Circuits applied the
National Labor Relations Act's ("NLRA")' 7 six-month statute of lim-
10. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a) (1988).
11. Id. § 2104(a)(5).
12. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Specialty Paperboard, Inc., 999 F.2d 51,
52-53 (2d Cir. 1993). Black's Law Dictionary defines a "statute of limitations" as
follows:
Statutes of the federal government and various states setting maximum time
periods during which certain actions can be brought or rights enforced. Af-
ter the time period set out in the applicable statute of limitations has run, no
legal action can be brought regardless of whether any cause of action ever
existed.
Black's Law Dictionary 927 (6th ed. 1990).
13. See, e.g., UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 707 (1966) (borrowing
six-year limitation period from Indiana law). In rare instances, federal courts have
refused to supply any limitation to a federal claim. Kimberly J. Norwood, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1658: A Limitation Period with Real Limitations, 69 Ind. L.J. 477, 480 n.12 (1994);
see, e.g., Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 368 (1977) (imposing no
limitation period against the Federal Government in EEOC actions); Mullikin v.
United States, 952 F.2d 920, 929 (6th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he government is not subject to a
statute of limitations on a cause of action in its favor unless the government expressly
so provides."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 85 (1992). These rare instances appear to be
limited to actions involving the Federal Government. Norwood, supra, at 480 n.12.
14. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171-72 (1983).
15. Id. at 172.
16. United Steelworkers v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 32 F.3d 53, 61 (3d Cir. 1994),
cert. granted, 63 U.S.L.W. 3514 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1995) (No. 94-834); United
Paperworkers Local 340 v. Specialty Paperboard, 999 F.2d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 1993).
17. United Mine Workers v. Peabody Coal Co., 38 F.3d 850, 856 (6th Cir. 1994);
Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp., 31 F.3d 224, 241 (5th Cir. 1994). The NLRA is
codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
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itations.18 The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to re-
solve this current conflict among the circuits. 9
This Note argues that the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have taken the
correct position. Applying state limitations periods to WARN actions
can lead to undesirable results, as illustrated by the following
hypothetical.
Graft, Inc. is a retailer of auto supplies that operates numerous
stores nationwide, maintains corporate headquarters in State X, and
employs over one thousand workers. Due to severe financial difficul-
ties in the past three years, Graft's Board of Directors has decided to
down-size operations by closing its Central City store, which is located
in State A and has sixty employees. Unaware of WARN's require-
ments, Graft's management gives notice of the store's closing only one
week before the complete shutdown, thus violating WARN's provi-
sions. Pursuant to WARN, Graft is liable to each affected worker for
back pay and benefits for each day of the violation, up to a maximum
of sixty days.
Four years after the layoff, two former employees of the Central
City store, Louis and Michael, sue Graft. Louis lives in State A and
Michael lives in State B, and each files suit in the state in which he
resides. Graft pleads the statute of limitations to both claims. States
A and B are located within the Fifteenth Circuit.
Because courts typically look to state law when faced with a federal
cause of action lacking a limitations period,' the question then be-
comes which state's law should supply the limitations period.2 1 Unfor-
tunately, federal courts do not address this issue uniformly.2
Some circuits automatically choose the forum state as the state from
which to borrow. 3 Others consult the conflict of laws principles24 of
18. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) ("[N]o complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor
practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the
[National Labor Relations] Board .... ).
19. United Steelworkers v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 32 F.3d 53, 61 (3d Cir. 1994),
cert. granted, 63 U.S.L.W. 3514 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1995) (No. 94-834).
20. Norwood, supra note 13, at 480.
21. Id.
22. Id
23. Id. at 481; see, e.g., Shaw v. McCorckle, 537 F.2d 1289, 1292 n.5 (5th Cir. 1976)
("Congress has created many federal rights without prescribing a period for enforce-
ment. In such cases the federal courts borrow the limitations period prescribed by the
state where the court sits.").
24. Blacks's Law Dictionary defines "conflict of laws" as follows:
Inconsistency or difference between the laws of different states or countries,
arising in the case of persons who have acquired rights, incurred obligations,
injuries or damages, or made contracts, within the territory of two or morejurisdictions. Hence, that branch of jurisprudence, arising from the diversity
of the laws of different nations, states or jurisdictions, in their application to
rights and remedies, which reconciles the inconsistency, or decides which law
or system is to govern in the particular case, or settles the degree of force to
be accorded to the law of another jurisdiction, (the acts or rights in question
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the forum state to determine which state's law will provide the limita-
tions period.' Still others refer to federal common law to decide
which state's law is applicable. 26 Assume that courts within the Fif-
teenth Circuit (where Louis and Michael initiate their respective suits)
follow the first approach listed above.
Consider Louis' case first. In determining whether his WARN
claim is timely, the district court judge, utilizing the first approach,
automatically borrows a limitation period from State A. Assume that
the judge adopts a six-year statute of limitations and, thus, concludes
that Louis' claim is timely. Now consider Michael's claim. In deter-
mining whether his suit is timhely, the court, also utilizing the first ap-
proach, borrows a limitations period from State B. Assume the court
here borrows a statute possessing only a two-year statute of limita-
tions; Michael's claim, therefore, is barred by the statute of
limitations.
This scenario illustrates one of several problems with borrowing a
state statute of limitations for WARN claims. Two plaintiffs suing
under the same federal statute have differing periods of time within
which they must bring suit. One federal court permitted Louis to pur-
sue his claim, while another federal court dismissed Michael's claim as
time barred. This disparity is inconsistent with both perceived and
actual fairness in the federal justice system. In enacting WARN, Con-
gress intended to create the same substantive right for all qualified
workers nationwide.2 7 Granting some workers a longer period of time
to bring suit than others is simply incompatible with this intention.
Now assume that seven years after the layoff, Nancy, a former Graft
employee who resides in State A, befriends a law student. After tell-
ing the student about her employment with Graft and the sudden lay-
off, the student informs Nancy that she may have rights against Graft.
Nancy consults an attorney who confirms the student's statements.
After researching the relevant case law, the attorney concludes that
the suit would be untimely if commenced in States A or B. If he files
the complaint in State C (also located within the Fifteenth Circuit),
having arisen under it) either where it varies from the domestic law, or
where the domestic law is silent or not exclusively applicable to the case in
point.
Black's Law Dictionary 299-300 (6th ed. 1990). The "choice of law" is the question
presented in determining what law should govern in conflicts of law. Id. at 241.
25. Norwood, supra note 13, at 481; see, e.g., Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870,
877 (10th Cir. 1982) (stating that when federal jurisdiction is based on § 27 of the
Securities Exchange Act, "[tihe federal court is required to follow the conflicts of laws
rules prevailing in the forum state.").
26. Norwood, supra note 13, at 481; see, e.g., Edelmann v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
861 F.2d 1291, 1294 n.14 (1st Cir. 1988) ("When jurisdiction is not based on diversity
of citizenship, choice of law questions are appropriately resolved as matters of federal
common law.").
27. See McHugh, supra note 8, at 4-12 (discussing the national problem of worker
displacement leading to the passage of WARN).
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however, the federal court, automatically borrowing a limitations pe-
riod from State C, would probably borrow a ten-year statute of limita-
tions. Thus, the attorney files suit in State C, and the court permits
Nancy to pursue her claim.
These actions by Nancy's attorney illustrate a second problem with
borrowing limitation periods from state law. Because federal courts
use different approaches to determine which state's law will provide
the limitations period, some courts may borrow from one state while
another court, under the same facts, may borrow from another juris-
diction. Moreover, because WARN permits claims to be brought in
any district where the employer does business,2s a plaintiff will often
have a choice of forums where he may commence suit. This generous
forum provision, coupled with the different approaches federal courts
utilize to determine the applicable state law, clearly creates the poten-
tial for a wily plaintiff to forum shop for the most favorable limitations
period.29
These hypotheticals also illustrate a third problem that occurs when
statutes of limitations can be borrowed from various states for WARN
claims. Employees such as Louis and Nancy, who were permitted to
pursue their claims, may recover back pay and benefits many years
after the alleged WARN violation occurred. This defeats the primary
purpose of WARN, which is to provide short-term assistance so that
workers can quickly adjust to an impending unemployment, seek new
employment, and learn a new skill if needed.3 0 To fulfill this purpose,
it is obvious that workers must be able to claim and receive assistance
as quickly after discharge as possible. Permitting recovery many years
after the violation occurred, thus, fails to accomplish this objective.
This Note addresses what statute of limitations should apply to
WARN claims. Part I discusses how the federal government regu-
lates, via WARN and the NLRA, an employer's decision to close a
plant or to initiate large reductions in the workforce. Part H tracks
the development of the state-borrowing doctrine from its roots in 1830
to the present. Part III examines the different analyses utilized by the
federal circuits to supply a limitations period to WARN claims. As
noted above, the Supreme Court will soon resolve this dispute. Part
IV argues that federal courts should apply the NLRA's six-month
statute of limitations 31 to WARN causes of action and concludes that
borrowing the NLRA's limitations period best effectuates Congress'
intended purpose when it enacted WARN. This part also concludes
28. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5) (1988).
29. "Forum shopping occurs when a litigant attempts to have his claim heard by a
court in a jurisdiction where he would receive a favorable decision." Stephen W. Bi-
alkowski, Note, 16 Seton Hall L. Rev. 831, 848 (1986).
30. 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(a) (1994).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988) ("[N]o complaint shall issue based upon any unfair
labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the
[National Labor Relations] Board....").
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that borrowing from the NLRA provides a uniform limitations period,
thus reducing the potential of forum shopping and ensuring that all
plaintiffs suing under WARN are treated equally.
I. FEDERAL REGULATION OF PLANT CLOSINGS AND MASS
LAYOFFS
On August 4, 1988, after fifteen years of debate, Congress finally
passed the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act.32
Congress enacted WARN to address the growing national problems
associated with worker displacement resulting from plant closings and
permanent mass layoffs.33 As one commentator succinctly stated:
In addition to severe emotional and physical problems, displaced
workers often experienced lengthy unemployment and reduced in-
come. Communities realized the effects of employer shutdowns
through decreased revenues. States confronted with increased un-
employment levels also assumed additional financial burdens. The
situation was exacerbated because very few employers disclosed
their decision to significantly reduce or cease operations in advance,
thus leaving workers and communities without an opportunity to
adjust and plan for the impending dislocation.34
WARN attempts to address these problems by requiring an employer
planning a plant closing or mass layoff to give the employees' union
(or each affected employee individually if no union exists) and the
state dislocated worker unit at least sixty calendar days notice of such
action.35 This advance notice is intended to protect workers, their
families, and communities by providing a period of transition to adjust
to the prospective loss of employment.36 During this period, the
worker has the opportunity to seek new employment opportunities
and learn new skills required to compete in the job market.37 In addi-
tion, this period provides notice to state dislocated worker units
so that they can promptly deliver relief assistance to dislocated
workers.38
Employers not providing the required advance notice are subject to
federal suits in districts where either (1) the alleged violation occurred
or (2) the employer transacts business.39 Affected employees, their
32. Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (1988) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109
(1988)).
33. See Christopher P. Yost, Note, The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notifi-
cation Act of 1988: Advance Notice Required?, 38 Cath. U. L. Rev. 675, 675-76 (1989).
34. Id. (footnotes omitted).
35. 29 U.S.C. 2102(a) (1988). See supra notes 2-6 for the statutory definitions of
"employer," "plant closing," "mass layoff," "affected employees," and "state dislo-
cated worker unit."
36. 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(a) (1994).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5) (1988).
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union representatives, or units of local government may initiate such
actions.4° Employers failing to comply with the Act's notice require-
ments are liable for back pay and benefits for each day the employee
is deprived of notice as well as civil penalties of $500 per day to the
local government.4'
40. 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(d) (1994).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a) (1988). WARN also provides seven exceptions that either
shorten the 60-day notice period or eliminate the notice requirement altogether. Mc-
Hugh, supra note 8, at 21. First, if an employer sells all or part of his business, the
responsibility to give notice remains with the seller up to and including the date of the
sale. 29 U.S.C. § 2101(b)(1) (1988). After the date of sale, however, the seller is no
longer responsible; rather, the buyer must provide notice of any plant closing or mass
layoff that takes place thereafter. Id Second, if the employer relocates or consoli-
dates part or all of its business, an employee does not suffer an employment loss,
provided that prior to the plant closing or mass layoff, the employer offers to transfer
the employee to a different site of employment within a reasonable commuting dis-
tance with no more than a six-month break in employment. Id. § 2101(b)(2). The
statute does not require a reasonable commuting distance if the employee accepts the
offer of transfer within 30 days of the offer or of the closing or layoff, whichever is
later. Id. If the transfer meets these requirements, then it is excluded from the calcu-
lation of employment losses utilized to determine whether a plant closing or mass
layoff has occurred. Id Third, when the employer, at the time that notice would have
been required, was actively seeking capital or business which, if obtained, would have
enabled the employer to avoid or postpone the shutdown, WARN allows an employer
to shorten the 60-day notice period. Id. § 2102(b)(1). The employer must have a good
faith belief that giving the proper notice would have prevented the employer from
obtaining the capital or business. Id. Furthermore, a realistic opportunity to obtain
the financing or business must exist. 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(a)(2) (1994). This exception is
only available for plant closings, not mass layoffs. See 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(1) (1988).
Fourth, if the plant closing or mass layoff is caused by business circumstances unfore-
seeable as of the time that notice would have been required, an employer may order a
plant closing or mass layoff before the conclusion of the 60-day period. Id.
§ 2102(b)(2)(A). An employer must exercise commercially reasonable business judg-
ment that a similarly situated employer would use in predicting market demands. 20
C.F.R. § 639.9(b)(2) (1994). Employers, however, are not required to predict general
economic trends. Id. Fifth, the statute does not require notice for a plant closing or
mass layoff resulting from a natural disaster, such as a flood, earthquake, or drought.
29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(2)(B) (1988). Sixth, the Act exempts employers from the notice
requirement if the plant closing or mass layoff results from a closing of a temporary
facility or the completion of a particular undertaking. Id. § 2103(1). This exemption,
however, only applies if the affected employees were hired with the understanding
that their employment was limited to the duration of the facility or undertaking. Id.
The employer bears the burden to show that the temporary nature of the facility or
undertaking was clearly communicated to the affected employees. 20 C.F.R.
§ 639.5(c)(2) (1994). Seasonal but recurring employees are not entitled to notice,
provided that they understood at the time they were hired that the work was tempo-
rary. ld. § 639.5(c)(3). Permanent employees assigned to temporary facilities or
projects are, however, entitled to notice upon a plant closing or mass layoff. Id. Sev-
enth, the Act also exempts the employer from the notice requirement if the plant
closing or mass layoff results directly from a strike or lockout not intended to evade
the Act's requirements. 29 U.S.C. § 2103(2) (1988). A lockout occurs when, "for tac-
tical or defensive reasons during the course of collective bargaining or during a labor
dispute, an employer lawfully refuses to utilize some or all of its employees for the
performance of available work." 20 C.F.R. § 639.5(d) (1994). Nonstriking employees
who experience an employment loss due to the strike are still entitled to notice. Id.
However, when a strike affects nonstriking employees, the required notice period may
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WARN, however, is not the only federal legislation governing an
employer's decision to initiate reductions in the workforce. The Na-
tional Labor Relations Act42 regulated these decisions long before
WARN ever existed,43 and today, both the NLRA and WARN over-
see these decisions.44
Congress passed the NLRA to minimize the "[i]ndustrial strife [be-
tween management and labor] which interferes with the normal flow
of [interstate] commerce." 45 To promote this free flow of commerce,
Congress sought "to ... proscribe practices on the part of labor and
management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general
welfare. '46 Furthermore, Congress established collective bargaining
as the method of resolving labor-management disputes.47 Although
management and labor may bargain about any legal matter, the
NLRA specifically mandates that management and labor "meet at
reasonable times and [bargain] in good faith [regarding] wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment. ' 48 An employer's de-
cision to close or relocate a plant may constitute a "term[ ] [or] condi-
tion[ ] of employment" and thus qualify as a mandatory subject of
good faith bargaining.49 In addition, the employer must bargain in
good faith with the union over the effects of the decision to close a
be reduced pursuant to the unforeseeable business circumstance exception or falter-
ing company exception. Id.
Furthermore, the employer's liability will be reduced accordingly if: (a) the em-
ployer pays the employee for the period of the violation, 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(2)(A)
(1988); (b) the employer makes any voluntary and unconditional payment to the em-
ployee not required by law, id. § 2104(a)(2)(B); (c) the employer makes a payment to
a third party on behalf of the employee and attributable to the employee for the
period of the violation, id. § 2104(a)(2)(C).
42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
43. For a thorough analysis of how the NLRA's provisions apply to plant closures
and mass layoffs, see Peter F. Munger et al., Plant Closures and Relocations Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 5 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 77 (1988).
44. See 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(g) (1994) ("The provisions of WARN do not supersede
any laws or collective bargaining agreements that provide for additional notice or
additional rights and remedies.").
45. 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1988).
46. Id.
47. Id.; Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964) ("One
of the primary purposes of the [NLRA] is to promote the peaceful settlement of in-
dustrial disputes by subjecting labor-management controversies to the mediatory in-
fluence of negotiation."); see Munger et al., supra note 43, at 78 ("[One of the
NLRA's bedrock principles is that labor peace is advanced by good faith bargaining
between management and labor.").
48. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). Congress created the National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB") to enforce the NLRA's requirements. Id. § 153. The NLRB has the
power to condemn labor or management actions as unfair labor practices that attempt
to circumvent the collective-bargaining process. Id. § 160.
49. The NLRB has established a three-prong test for determining whether a deci-
sion to relocate or to close a plant is a mandatory subject of good faith bargaining.
United Food & Commercial Workers, Local No. 150-A v. NLRB, 1 F.3d 24,30 (D.C.
Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 62 U.S.L.W. 3653 (U.S. Apr. 4,1994) (No. 93-1103). The first
prong exempts decisions that lie "at the core of entrepreneurial control." Id. (citing
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plant.50 To comply with these requirements of good faith bargaining,
the employer must provide the union with prior notification of the
intended closure so that the union has a "significant opportunity to
bargain about these matters of job security... mandated by... [the
NLRA]. 51
Even though WARN and the NLRA both regulate employer deci-
sions to initiate reductions in the workforce, the two statutes are not
identical. Viewed from a narrow perspective, the two legislations
share different purposes. The NLRA focuses on the continuing em-
ployer-employee relationship, seeking to protect the rights of workers
to unionize5 2 and bargain collectively with their employers53 and to
provide for the rapid resolution of labor disputes.- In fact, the
Supreme Court has stated that the NLRA's six-month statute of limi-
tations represented Congress' attempt to balance the national interest
in stable bargaining relationships with the employee's interest in set-
ting aside an unfair settlement under the collective bargaining sys-
tem.55 WARN's purpose, on the other hand, is to furnish short-term
assistance to displaced workers after the employer-employee relation-
ship has ended.56
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., con-
curring)). Specifically, employers are not required to bargain over decisions
involving (1) "a basic change in the nature of the employer's operation," (2)
"a change in the scope and direction of the enterprise," (3) situations in
which "the work performed at the new location varies significantly from the
work performed at the former plant," or (4) situations in which "the work
performed at the former plant is to be discontinued entirely and not moved
to the new location."
Id (quoting Dubuque Packing Co., 303 N.L.R.B. 386, 391 (1991)). The second prong
excuses employers from bargaining over relocation decisions that were motivated by
labor costs. Id. (citing Dubuque Packing, 303 N.L.R.B. at 391). The third prong re-
lieves employers from bargaining when the union could not have offered concessions
that could have changed the employer's plan to close or relocate its plant. Id. (citing
Dubuque Packing, 303 N.L.R.B. at 391).
50. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681-82 (1981). "Effects
bargaining" relates to bargaining over matters of employee job security that the plant
closure or relocation will alter. Kyle B. Hettinger, Note, NLRA Preemption of State
and Local Plant Relocation Laws, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 407, 413 (1986). Bargaining is
mandated over issues such as severance pay, transfer rights, seniority, and pensions.
Id.
51. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. at 681.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
53. Id. § 157; Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964)
("One of the primary purposes of the [NLRAI is to promote the peaceful settlement
of industrial disputes by subjecting labor-management controversies to the mediatory
influence of negotiation.").
54. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 168 (1983).
55. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171 (citing United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451
U.S. 56, 70-71 (1981)).
56. See 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a) (1988) (stating that cause of action accrues after an
employer orders a plant closing without giving proper notice; thus, WARN provides
relief to workers who have already been terminated).
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WARN and the NLRA also differ in how claims under each statute
are prosecuted. Whereas WARN creates a private right of action al-
lowing alleged victims to recover back pay and benefits,57 the NLRA
possesses an administrative structure to help workers protect their
statutory rights.58 Under the NLRA, an aggrieved worker first must
file a claim with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), and
the Board prosecutes the claim, if it chooses to do so.59 One might
reasonably infer that this administrative structure further justifies a
relatively short limitations period for actions brought under the
NLRA.
Although possessing somewhat different purposes and structures,
significant interrelationships and similarities exist between WARN
and the NLRA. The Department of Labor's regulations implement-
ing WARN illustrate two of these interrelationships. 60 The regula-
tions state:
The provisions of WARN do not supersede any laws or collective
bargaining agreements that provide for additional notice or addi-
tional rights and remedies. If such law or agreement provides for a
longer notice period, WARN notice shall run concurrently with that
additional notice period. Collective bargaining agreements may be
used to clarify or amplify the terms and conditions of WARN, but
may not reduce WARN rights.61
Thus, these regulations stipulate that the WARN notice shall automat-
ically increase if the collective bargaining agreement so provides. The
regulations also permit WARN to clarify the "terms and conditions"
of the agreement.62 In fact, the Department of Labor referred fre-
quently to the NLRA when issuing WARN's regulations,63 and be-
cause of this extensive borrowing, courts often refer to NLRA case
law when interpreting WARN.6a Indeed, one may even view WARN
as a clarification of the NLRA.65 As noted above, the NLRA requires
57. 29 U.S.C. § 2104 (1988).
58. See id. § 153 (creating the NLRB to enforce the NLRA's requirements).
59. Id. § 160.
60. Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp., 31 F.3d 224, 233 (1994).
61. 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(g) (1994).
62. Halkias, 31 F.3d at 233.
63. See 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(d) (1994) (defining "representative" for WARN pur-
poses by explicit reference to §§ 9(a) and 8(f) of the NLRA); id. § 639.3(a)(2) (defin-
ing "independent contractors and subsidiaries" by reference to "existing legal rules,"
that is, case law interpreting the NLRA); see also 54 Fed. Reg. 16,045 (1989) (explic-
itly looking to NLRA for guidance in promulgating a definition of "independent con-
tractors and subsidiaries" pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(2)); 54 Fed. Reg. 16,044-45
(1989) (discussing promulgation of "reasonable expectation of recall" language in 20
C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(1) by referring to NLRA case law).
64. Halkias, 31 F.3d at 232; see, e.g., Damron v. Rob Fork Mining Corp., 739 F.
Supp. 341, 344 (E.D. Ky. 1990) (determining whether an employee would "reasonably
experience an employment loss" by referring to the NLRB's use of the "reasonable
expectation of recall" test), aff'd, 945 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1991).
65. See Halkias, 31 F.3d at 232.
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an employer to bargain in good faith with the union concerning the
effects of a decision to close a plant.' To satisfy this duty, employers
must notify the union prior to the closing so that the union has a
meaningful opportunity to bargain.' WARN essentially sets a spe-
cific time period for notice and expands this protection to cover all
employees regardless of union status.' Finally, viewed from a
broader perspective, both statutes essentially seek to protect workers
by restricting management decisions, and the NLRA's objective of
proscribing management activities "[that] affect commerce and are in-
imical to the general welfare"69 is entirely consistent with WARN's
goal of protecting both workers and their communities.
70
While WARN provides for a private federal cause of action as the
enforcement mechanism against employers violating its terms,
71
WARN, unlike the NLRA, does not contain a statute of limitations.'
When a federal claim lacks a statute of limitations, federal courts must
determine within what period of time a plaintiff must sue.' The fol-
lowing section addresses how federal courts traditionally have made
this determination-by borrowing a limitations period from state law.
66. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681-82 (stating that
§ 8(a)(5) of the NLRA requires that "bargaining over the effects of a decision must be
conducted in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful time").
67. Munger et al., supra note 43, at 115; Yost, supra note 33, at 684.
68. Halkias, 31 F.3d at 232.
69. 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
70. United Mine Workers v. Peabody Coal Co., 38 F.3d 850, 856 (6th Cir. 1994).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5) (1988).
72. United Paperworkers Local 340 v. Specialty Paperboard, Inc., 999 F.2d 51, 52
(2d Cir. 1993).
73. Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342 (1805) (noting that to impose no
time limitation on a federal cause of action would be "utterly repugnant to the genius
of our laws").
On December 1, 1990, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1658, mandating a residual
four-year limitation period for any civil action arising under an Act of Congress. Pub.
L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5114 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (Supp. IV 1992)). Con-
gress passed § 1658 because of its unhappiness with the state-borrowing doctrine. See
136 Cong. Rec. S17,581 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (noting
that state borrowing "creates several practical problems: It obligates judges and law-
yers to determine the most analogous state law claim; it imposes uncertainty on liti-
gants; reliance on varying state laws result in undesirable variance among the federal
courts and disrupts the development of federal doctrine on the suspension of limita-
tion periods."); see also H.R. Rep. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1990), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6870 (containing similar language). This statute is only
applicable to a civil action arising under an Act of Congress enacted after December
1, 1990. 28 U.S.C § 1658 (Supp. IV 1992). Congress refused to apply the statute retro-
actively to avoid disrupting the settled expectations of parties who have relied on
prior judicial determinations of applicable limitations periods. H.R. Rep. No. 734,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6870.
Because Congress enacted WARN in 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890
(1988) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988)), § 1658 clearly is not applicable to
WARN claims. Thus, the onus still falls on the federal courts to determine how long a
plaintiff has to initiate action.
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE-BORROWING DOCTRINE
When Congress explicitly creates a new cause of action but fails to
include an applicable statute of limitations, courts generally borrow a
limitations period from state law.74 Federal courts must then deter-
mine which state's law supplies the limitations period.75 Federal cir-
cuit courts have used three different approaches to make this
determination.76 Under one approach, courts automatically borrow a
limitations period from the state where the court sits. 77 Under the
second approach, federal courts refer to the conflict of laws rules of
the forum state to determine which state's law would have governed
had federal subject matter jurisdiction been based upon diversity of
citizenship rather than federal question.7 8 Under the third approach,
conflict of laws principles in federal question cases are a matter of
federal common law.79 Some courts that follow this third approach
consult the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws for guidance in
selecting the state whose law should apply;80 other courts have held
that under "federal choice of law [principles],... the forum state's
statute of limitations.., controls, unless a party can demonstrate that
the adoption of the forum state's limitation period will substantially
undermine federal... policy."'81
Under each approach, the court still borrows a statute of limitations
from state law.' Which state's statute of limitations a court applies,
however, depends in part on where the plaintiff commences suit. As a
result, federal courts sitting in different states might conceivably apply
differing limitations periods for the same federal cause of action sim-
ply because an action is brought in one state instead of another.
74. See, e.g., UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 707 (borrowing six-
year limitation period from Indiana law).
75. Norwood, supra note 13, at 480.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 481; see, e.g., Shaw v. McCorckle, 537 F.2d 1289, 1292 n.5 (5th Cir. 1976)("Congress has created many federal rights without prescribing a period for enforce-
ment. In such cases the federal courts borrow the limitations period prescribed by the
state where the court sits.").
78. Norwood, supra note 13, at 481; see, e.g., Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870,
877 (10th Cir. 1982) (stating that when federal jurisdiction is based on § 27 of the
Securities Exchange Act, "[t]he federal court is required to follow the conflicts of laws
rules prevailing in the forum state").
79. Norwood, supra note 13, at 481; see, e.g., Edelmann v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
861 F.2d 1291, 1294 n.14 (1st Cir. 1988) ("When jurisdiction is not based on diversity
of citizenship, choice of law questions are appropriately resolved as matters of federal
common law.").
80. Norwood, supra note 13, at 481; see, e.g., Edelmann, 861 F.2d at 1295 (looking
at several Restatement factors in choosing the applicable rule of law).
81. Champion Int'l Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 779 F.2d 328, 334
(6th Cir. 1985).
82. Norwood, supra note 13, at 482.
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A. Traditional Rationale for the State-Borrowing Doctrine
Traditionally, the Supreme Court cited the Rules of Decision Act,
as the source of the obligation to utilize a state statute of limitations
for causes of action arising under federal law. In McCluny v. Sil-
liman,84 for example, the Court held that the Rules of Decision Act
mandated application of state statutes of limitations whenever Con-
gress failed to provide one. 5 In that case, the plaintiff sought to buy
land under a federal statute providing for public sales of land owned
by the United States. 6 When the defendant, the United States land
office register in Ohio, refused to enter the application in his office's
books, the plaintiff sued, seeking a common-law writ of trespass on
the case. 87
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court never questioned the
state's ability to enact statutes of limitations for federal rights, absent
some act by Congress stating otherwise.' It simply proclaimed that
"[u]nder th[e] [Rules of Decisions Act], the acts of limitations of the
several states, where no special provision ha[d] been made by
[C]ongress, form[ed] a rule of decision in the courts of the United
States." 9
Although the federal statute in McCluny was clearly the source of
the plaintiff's claim, that statute did not expressly create the cause of
action.90 What if, however, the federal statute explicitly created the
cause of action? Did the Rules of Decision Act mandate adopting
state statutes of limitations in this scenario as well?
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988). The Rules of Decision Act provides: "The laws of
the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or
Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision
in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." Id.
84. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830).
85. See id. at 277-78.
86. Id. at 275-76.
87. See id. at 278. The defendant prevailed at the trial level on the ground that the
plaintiff did not file suit until after the state's statute of limitations had run. On ap-
peal, the plaintiff argued that a state's statute of limitations is not applicable in a suit
brought in federal court against a federal officer for a violation of a right granted by
Congress. The plaintiff based this argument on the premise that the state legislature,
in enacting its statute of limitations, did not intend for it to apply to federally created
rights. Id. at 276-77.
88. Id
89. Id. In determining which state's law might apply, the Court only considered a
limitations period from Ohio, the forum state. Id. at 276-77. In so doing, the Court
stated that the applicable "statute of limitations is the law of the forum [state]." I& at
277.
90. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 160 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
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In Campbell v. City of Haverhill,91 the Supreme Court held that a
state statute of limitations applied in a suit for patent infringement 92
even though Congress had given federal courts exclusive jurisdiction
over such cases.9 3 As in McCluny, the Court reasoned that the Rules
of Decision Act mandated use of state limitations periods when Con-
gress failed to provide one.94 The Court also noted that the fact that
the patent statute created exclusive federal jurisdiction was not signifi-
cant. The Rules of Decision Act did not suggest a distinction between
cases where the jurisdiction was concurrent with state courts and
those where federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction.95
B. Modern Rationale for the State-Borrowing Doctrine
The Rules of Decision Act authorizes application of state law only
when federal law does not "otherwise require or provide.'9 6 Despite
the early precedents of McCluny and Campbell, later Supreme Court
decisions have recognized that choosing a limitations period (even if
the court borrows a statute of limitations from state law) is a question
of federal law.97 Because federal law is applicable, the Rules of Deci-
sion Act cannot mandate applying state law when supplying a federal
statute with a limitations period, and, as a result, cannot serve as the
rationale for the state-borrowing doctrine.
Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly reject the Rules of
Decision Act as the source of the state-borrowing doctrine until
1983,98 the Court began justifying the doctrine with a different ration-
ale many years earlier. In Holmberg v. Armbrecht,99 the Court contin-
91. 155 U.S. 610 (1895). In Campbell, the plaintiff sued the City of Haverhill for
patent infringement almost seven years after the last day the patent was vested in him.
The defendant pleaded the statute of limitations, arguing that Massachusetts' six-year
limitations period was applicable. The plaintiff countered that the six-year state stat-
ute of limitations was not applicable to his patent claim. He contended that the
"[s]tates, having no power to create the right or enforce the remedy [because of exclu-
sive jurisdiction], ha[d] no power to limit such remedy or to legislate in any manner
with respect to the subject-matter." Id. at 613-15.
92. Id. at 620-21.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988).
94. Campbell, 155 U.S. at 616. The Court did not undertake an analysis to deter-
mine which state's law applied. See id. at 613-14. It only considered Massachusetts
law, presumably because the plaintiff brought the action in Massachusetts, the defend-
ant was a city in Massachusetts, and the defendant only argued for a limitations pe-
riod from this state.
95. Id.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988) (emphasis added).
97. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159-61 n.13(1983).
98. See id.
99. 327 U.S. 392 (1946). In Holmberg, the creditors of a failed bank sued the
bank's shareholders, seeking to enforce a liability imposed upon the shareholders by a
federal statute. This statute lacked a limitations period. The plaintiffs filed suit in
1932, but the suit failed on procedural grounds; it was dismissed without prejudice.
The creditors brought suit against certain shareholders again in 1943. The defendant's
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ued to adhere to the general rule that when Congress neglected to
prescribe a statute of limitations for a cause of action, federal courts
shall apply state limitation periods."co The Court, however, did not
cite the Rules of Decision Act as the source of this proposition.10'
Instead, the Court stated that "federal courts, sitting as national courts
throughout the country, [must] apply their own principles in enforcing
a[] ... right created by Congress. ' '""a Thus, the Court suggested that
supplying a limitations period for a federally created right is a ques-
tion of federal law, and, thus, the Rules of Decisions Act is not con-
trolling. In rationalizing state borrowing, the Court interpreted
congressional silence to mean that "it is federal policy to adopt the
[state] law of limitation."'0 3
In UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., ° the Supreme Court adopted
an approach similar to the one used in Holmberg. In Hoosier Cardi-
nal, employees filed suit in federal court under section 301 of the La-
bor Management Relations Act.'05 Section 301 confers jurisdiction
upon the federal district courts over suits upon collective bargaining
agreements,'10 6 but it does not provide a statute of limitations."' 7 The
company moved to dismiss, arguing that Indiana's six-year limitation
period barred the suit.'0 8 The employees argued, predictably, that a
state statute of limitations could not bar the action." They urged the
court to adopt a uniform limitation period to fill the statutory gap." 0
pleaded the statute of limitations, invoking New York's 10-year limitations period.
The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals reversed,
however, holding that the cause of action was time-barred. Id. at 393-95.
100. Id. at 395.
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 383 U.S. 696 (1966). In Hoosier Cardinal, a union and the company had a
collective bargaining agreement. A provision in that agreement provided for pay-
ment of accumulated vacation pay upon an employee's termination. In 1957, the
company, while the agreement was still in effect, terminated employees covered by
the agreement and refused to pay them for unused vacation time. In 1958, the ag-
grieved employees sued the company in state court. The state court dismissed the suit
because it found the action impermissible as a matter of state law. A second suit was
brought in state court, but the court dismissed on the same grounds. The employees
then filed suit in federal court. Ld. at 698-99.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 697. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act provides:
(a) . . . Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as
defined [by the Labor Management Relations Act], or between any such
labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in contro-
versy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties ....
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
107. Hoosier Cardinal, 383 U.S. at 697-98.
108. Ia at 699.
109. Id. at 701.
110. Id.
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The Court stated that supplying a statute of limitations period is a
question of federal law:"' "[T]he question of [the suit's] timeliness is
squarely presented. It is clearly a federal question, for in [section] 301
suits the applicable law is 'federal law, which the courts must fashion
from the policy of our national labor laws.' "11 Thus, the Court once
again did not utilize the Rules of Decisions Act as the source of this
judicial power." 3 Nevertheless, it still declined to explicitly reject this
proposition."
4
In Hoosier Cardinal, the Court adhered to the general rule it first
adopted in McCluny: when a federally created action lacks a limita-
tions period, the appropriate state statute of limitations should deter-
mine the timeliness of the suit." 5 The Court stated:
[I]t cannot be fairly inferred that when Congress left [section] 301
without a uniform time limitation, it did so in the expectation that
the courts would invent one.... Since [1830], state statutes have
repeatedly supplied the periods of limitations for federal causes of
action when federal legislation has been silent on the question. Yet
when Congress has disagreed with such an interpretation of its si-
lence, it has spoken to overturn it by enacting a uniform period of
limitations."
Thus, the Court once again reasoned that congressional silence meant
that Congress implicitly approved of borrowing state statutes of
limitations." 7
In DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters," 8 the
Supreme Court finally conceded that the Rules of Decision Act no
longer provides the source of the general rule of state borrowing." 9
The Court reaffirmed the proposition that supplying a limitations pe-
riod for a federally created right is a question of federal law.'20 It
stated that "we [apply state limitations to many federal causes of ac-
tion] as a matter of interstitial fashioning of remedial details under the
respective substantive federal statutes, and not because the Rules of
Decision Act ... requires it."'' The Court rationalized the state-
borrowing doctrine in the following manner:
111. Id.
112. Id. (quoting Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,456 (1957)).
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. Id. at 704-05. The Court did not engage in a choice of law analysis to deter-
mine which state's law applied. Id. at 705 n.8. It only considered statutes of limita-
tions from Indiana law because Indiana was the forum state, all operative events
occurred there, and neither party argued that a limitations period of another state was
applicable. Id.
116. Id. at 703-04 (citations and footnote omitted).
117. Id. at 704.
118. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
119. Id. at 159 n.13.
120. Id. at 159 n.12.
121. Id. at 160 n.13.
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In such cases [where Congress has not given any express considera-
tion to the problem of selecting a limitation period], the general
preference for borrowing state limitations periods ... [is] a sort of
fallback rule of thumb... ; it rests on the assumption that, absent
some sound reason to do otherwise, Congress would likely intend
that the courts follow their previous practice of borrowing state
provisions. 122
Thus, as it did in Holmberg and Hoosier Cardinal, the Court justified
the doctrine by interpreting congressional silence as implicit approval
of federal courts continuing to adhere to their state-borrowing
practice. 123
C. The Exception to the General Rule of State-Borrowing
Although the Supreme Court in Hoosier Cardinal continued the
practice of applying a state statute of limitations to a federal cause of
action otherwise lacking one, the Court hinted that an exception may
exist to this general rule. The Court stated that the federal policy at
issue in that case was the "formation of the collective agreement and
the private settlement of disputes under it."" 2 It then noted that the
statute of limitations was implicated only when these bargaining
processes had broken down already."~ Thus, because statutes of limi-
tations did not affect these processes, the Court concluded that a uni-
form limitations period was unnecessary. 121 This discussion suggests,
however, that a uniform statute of limitations would be necessary
when federal policies are affected. If uniformity were the objective,
borrowing different limitations periods from each state obviously
would not achieve this end.
The Supreme Court did, in fact, create an exception to the general
rule in DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters.121 The
Court recognized that state law is not the sole source for borrowing
122. Id. at 158 n.12.
123. Id.
124. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 702 (1966).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 702-03.
127. 462 U.S. 151 (1983). In DelCostello, the plaintiff, a unionized employee of a
tractor-trailer company, was allegedly discharged for refusing to drive what he
thought was an unsafe tractor-trailer. The date of discharge was June 27, 1977. Pur-
suant to the collective bargaining agreement, the union instituted a formal grievance.
The grievance ultimately failed. Subsequently, the plaintiff, on March 16, 1978, insti-
tuted an action in federal court against the employer and the union. Against the
employer, the plaintiff, pursuant to § 301 of the NLRA, alleged wrongful discharge
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. Against the union, the plaintiff as-
serted violations of the union's duty of fair representation, alleging "discriminatory,
arbitrary and perfunctory" representation in the formal grievance procedure that re-
sulted in the grievance's failure. The employer and union pleaded the statute of limi-
tations, asserting that Maryland's 30-day statute of limitations for vacating arbitration
awards was applicable. Id. at 155-56. The Court concluded that in appropriate cir-
cunstances, timeliness rules may be drawn from federal law because Congress would
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limitations periods. In certain circumstances, courts may also borrow
a statute of limitations from federal law.
The Court in DelCostello created two conditions precedent that
must be present for a federal court to invoke an exception to the state-
borrowing doctrine: "[First,] ... a rule from elsewhere in federal law
[must] clearly provide[ ] a closer analogy than available state statutes,
and [second,] the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of liti-
gation [must] make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle
for interstitial lawmaking."'"
In DelCostello, the employee-plaintiff brought an action under sec-
tion 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act against an employer
for wrongful termination and against the union for breaching its duty
of fair representation.119 This action followed the union's unsuccess-
ful attempt to vindicate the employee's grievance through formal
grievance procedures established by the collective bargaining agree-
ment. 130 The Court first considered two state statutes of limitations,
one for vacating arbitration awards and the other regarding legal
malpractice.13'
not choose "to adopt state [limitation] rules at odds with the purpose or operation of
federal substantive law." Id. at 161.
In an accompanying case joined for consideration, the facts were substantially the
same. Throughout 1975 and 1976, two unionized employees filed several grievances
against their employers, alleging violations of the collective bargaining agreement that
ultimately resulted in their layoffs or reassignments. The union unsuccessfully pur-
sued the grievances pursuant to the procedure established in the collective bargaining
agreement. It then invoked arbitration, but the arbitrator ruled in favor of the em-
ployer. On January 9, 1979, these employees filed suit against the employer and the
union. The complaint against the employer alleged violations of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. The complaint against the union alleged violations of the union's
duty of fair representation. Both defendants argued that the suits were barred by
New York's 90-day statute of limitations as applied to actions vacating arbitration
awards. Id. at 156-57.
A union's duty of fair representation is implied under the NLRA. Id. at 164. The
Court explained the duty's existence in the following manner:
[Ilt is the policy of the [NLRA] to allow a single labor organization to repre-
sent collectively the interests of all employees within a unit, thereby depriv-
ing individuals in the unit of the ability to bargain individually or to select a
minority union as their representative. In such a system, if individual em-
ployees are not to be deprived of all effective means of protecting their own
interests, it must be the duty of the representative organization "to serve the
interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any .... "
Id. at 164 n.14 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,177). An employee has the option
to sue either the employer, the union, or both. Id. at 165. "'To prevail against either
the company or the Union, . . . [employee-plaintiffs] must not only show that their
discharge was contrary to the contract but must also carry the burden of demonstrat-
ing a breach of duty by the Union.' "Id. at 165 (quoting United Parcel Service, Inc. v.
Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 66-67 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring) (citation omitted)). Es-
sentially, the employees' claim is a hybrid § 301/fair representation claim. Id. at 165.
128. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172.
129. Id. at 155-57, 164.
130. Id. at 155.
131. Id. at 165-68.
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The Court concluded that the typically short state limitations peri-
ods for vacating arbitration awards13 frustrates a plaintiff's ability to
vindicate his rights against the employer and the union.1 33 The Court
noted that the plaintiff's suit consists of a combination of two causes
of action'34-one against the employer for an alleged breach of the
collective bargaining agreement and another against the union for
breach of the union's duty of fair representation.1 35 Although the
plaintiff could sue the employer or the union independently, to re-
cover against either defendant, the employee is required to prove that
his discharge had violated the terms of the agreement and that the
union had breached its duty of fair representation.1 36 Thus, before
commencing his suit, the employee needs to evaluate the adequacy of
the union's representation within the limitations period.1 37 Because
workers are generally unsophisticated in collective bargaining matters,
the cause of action requires a statute of limitations longer than that
for vacating arbitration awards.'
31
In addition, the Court questioned the similarity between an action
to vacate an arbitration award and the plaintiff's claims against the
union, calling the analogy "problematic at best."'1 39 An arbitration
proceeding pits the employee against the employer only; it does
not resolve any dispute between the employee and the union.' The
union merely acts as the employee's representative at the
proceeding.
14 1
The Court then compared the hybrid section 301/fair representation
cause of action and an action based upon legal malpractice. 42 The
Court admitted that an attorney's mishandling of an arbitration is
132. Maryland's statute of limitations for an action to vacate arbitration awards is
30 days. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-224 (1989). New York's limitations
period for the same action is 90 days. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L & R. 7511(a) (McKinney
1980). See also DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 166 n.15 (noting that the majority of states
require a plaintiff to commence such an action within 90 days or three months).
133. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 166. Quite logically, the Court did not determine
which state's arbitration law might apply. See id. at 165-67. Instead, it noted that the
majority of states require plaintiffs to commence such suits within 90 days or three
months. Id. at 166 n.15. Because of the brevity of these statutes of limitations, the
Court ultimately concluded that borrowing from them is inappropriate. Id. at 166.
Thus, undertaking a choice of law analysis to determine which state's arbitration pe-
riod might apply would have been futile.
134. Id. at 165.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 166.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 167.
140. See id
141. Id.
142. Id. at 167-68. Understandably, the Court did not determine which state's legal
malpractice law might apply. Because the Court concluded that legal malpractice ac-
tions in general are inappropriate substitutes for hybrid § 301/fair representation
claims, id. at 167-69, embarking on such an analysis would have been fruitless.
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somewhat analogous to the union's mishandling the plaintiff's griev-
ances. 43 The Court, however, also noted a difference between the
two causes of action.144 A party suing his attorney for the mishandling
of an arbitration typically recovers his entire damages,145 but in a sec-
tion 301/fair representation claim, the union may only be held liable
for increases in the employee's damages caused by the union's
actions."46
Furthermore, the Court stated that application of a longer malprac-
tice statute against unions would interfere with the important federal
policy of facilitating the rapid resolution of labor disputes. 47 The
Court observed that the grievance procedure is an integral part of the
collective bargaining process because it is a" 'vehicle by which mean-
ing and content are given to the collective bargaining agreement.' ",148
This collective bargaining system "could easily become unworkable if
a decision which has given 'meaning and content' to the terms of an
agreement, and even affected subsequent modifications of the agree-
ment, could suddenly be called into question as much as [three] years
later."'1 4
9
After addressing both state law alternatives, the Court analyzed
whether the NLRA's six-month statute of limitations 50 provides an
appropriate analogue from which to borrow. The Court observed that
hybrid section 301/fair representation claims against the union and
employer also implicate the policy considerations that Congress bal-
anced when determining the length of a limitations period for claims
arising under the NLRA.15 1 In selecting a six-month limitations pe-
riod for the NLRA, "Congress established a limitations period at-
tuned to what it viewed as the proper balance between the national
interests in stable bargaining relationships and finality of private set-
tlements, and an employee's interest in setting aside what he views as
an unjust settlement under the collective-bargaining system.' 5 2 The
Court reasoned that the facts in DelCostello implicate these interests
as well, because such claims represent a direct attack to the private
dispute settlement mechanism established under the collective bar-
gaining agreement. 5 3 In addition, the Court noted that substantial
143. Id. at 167.
144. Id. at 167-68.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 168.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 168-69 (quoting United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 63
(citation omitted)).
149. Id. at 169 (quoting Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 64).
150. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988) ("[N]o complaint shall issue based upon any unfair
labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the
[National Labor Relations] Board...
151. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 170-71.
152. Id. at 171 (citing Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 70).
153. See id. at 168-71.
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overlap exists between the rights asserted in the two contexts;'a that
is, many duty-of-fair-representation claims and alleged violations by
the employer of the collective bargaining agreement often amount to
unfair labor practices as well.15
Thus, the Court concluded that the NLRA's statute of limitations
provides a closer analogy than does either state law alternative. 5 6
Furthermore, the federal policies at stake make the NLRA a "signifi-
cantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking." 1  Conse-
quently, with both conditions precedent present, the Court invoked
the exception and borrowed the NLRA's six-month limitation
period.'5 8
In Reed v. United Transportation Union,'5 9 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether to invoke the exception to the state-bor-
rowing doctrine."6 A close reading of the decision illustrates,
however, that the Court modified the framework it used in DelCos-
tello. In Reed, the plaintiff filed suit under section 101(a)(2) of Title I
154. Id. at 170.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 169.
157. Id at 172.
158. Id.
159. 488 U.S. 319 (1989). Here, the plaintiff was the secretary and treasurer of the
union-defendant. Id at 321. He sought to receive reimbursement for carrying out
union duties, but the union refused this request. Id. at 321-22. Plaintiff charged that
he had been denied reimbursement because he had been critical of the union's presi-
dent. Id at 322. More than two years after the union denied this charge, the plaintiff
filed suit under § 101(a)(2) of Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act. Id.
160. Reed is the most recent Supreme Court decision case dealing directly with the
state-borrowing doctrine as it applies to causes of action expressly created by Con-
gress. In Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind et aL v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991), a plurality of
the Court gleaned a three-part hierarchical inquiry for ascertaining the appropriate
limitations period for a federal cause of action where Congress failed to provide one.
Id. at 356-58. "First, the court must determine whether a uniform statute of limita-
tions is to be selected. Where ... a single state limitations period may not be consist-
ently applied within a jurisdiction, we have concluded that the federal interests in
predictability and judicial economy counsel the adoption of one source." Id. at 357.
"Second, assuming a uniform limitations period is appropriate, the court must decide
whether this period should be derived from a state or federal source." Id. In making
this determination, the court should be aware of the potential to forum shop. Id (cit-
ing Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 154 (1987)). Third,
even if the limitation should be derived from a federal source, "a court [must] deter-
mine that an analogous federal source truly affords a 'closer fit' with the cause of
action at issue than does any available state-law source.... [S]uch factors as common-
ality of purpose and similarity of elements will be relevant." Id. at 357-58.
Gilbertson, however, lacks precedential value for purposes of this Note. First, only
a plurality of the Court joined this part of the decision. Id at 351. Second, the plural-
ity's statements were clearly dicta. In Gilbertson, the Court addressed the issue of
supplying a limitation period to a cause of action implied under a statute that already
contained an express cause of action. This Note, however, deals with how federal
courts should supply a limitations period for a cause of action that Congress explicitly
created and which is not implied as part of a larger statutory scheme.
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of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 161
("LMRDA"), alleging that the union violated its members' right to
free speech as to union matters. 62 Congress failed to supply a statute
of limitations for section 101 actions.' 63 The defendant argued that
the NLRA's six-month statute of limitations should govern the
claim.164
The Court first compared section 101(a)(1) claims to claims brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which lacks a statute of limitations period, but
for which the Court has usually borrowed a limitations period from
state personal injury statutes. 65 The Court observed that Congress, in
passing the LMRDA, intended to restate a First Amendment value,
that is, protection of free speech and assembly rights.' 66 The Court
then noted that section 101(a)(1) claims are similar to claims arising
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983167 because § 1983 prohibits infringement of
First Amendment rights by persons acting under color of law. 168 This
similarity, coupled with prior Supreme Court decisions finding that
§ 1983 is analogous to state personal injury statutes, 69 led the Court
161. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1988). Section 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA provides:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY. Every member of any labor
organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with other
members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express
at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates in an elec-
tion of the labor organization or upon any business properly before the
meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules per-
taining to the conduct of the meeting ....
Id. This section is enforceable by private right of action. Id. § 412.
162. Reed, 488 U.S. at 321.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 322.
165. Id at 326-27.
166. Id. at 325. Congress" 'adopted the freedom of speech and assembly provision
in order to promote union democracy... [and] recognized that democracy would be
assured only if union members are free to discuss union policies and criticize the lead-
ership without fear of reprisal.'" Id. (quoting United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457
U.S. 102, 112 (1982)).
167. Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of
the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
168. Reed, 488 U.S. at 326-27.
169. Id.; see also Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 236 (1989) (holding that courts
considering § 1983 claims should borrow the state's personal injury statute of
limitations).
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to conclude that section 101(a)(2) claims are also analogous to claims
arising under state personal injury statutes. 70
The Court then compared LMRDA claims to claims arising under
the NLRA, concluding that the claims are not sufficiently analogous
because the interests implicated in each statute are different.17 1 It
concluded that the NLRA seeks to accommodate the national inter-
ests in "' "stable bargaining relationships and the finality of private
settlements,"' "1 while section 101(a)(2), on the other hand, seeks to
accommodate the national interest in free speech.173 The Court also
did not give any weight to the overlap in causes of action between the
two statutes because the overlap "would not be attributable to similar
federal policies underlying each of these areas of protection., 74
Based upon this analysis, the Court concluded that state personal
injury actions provide a closer analogy to the LMRDA than does the
NLRA. 175 Thus, the first condition precedent of DelCostello required
for the exception to be invoked is absent because federal law does not
provide a closer analogy than the state law alternative. Because both
conditions precedent could not have been present, the Court should
have automatically applied the general rule and borrowed a limita-
tions period from state personal injury actions.
The Court, however, did not immediately conclude that it was
bound to borrow a state statute of limitations.176 Instead, the Court
stated:
In light of the analogy between [section] 101(a)(2) and personal in-
jury actions, and of the lack of any conflict between the practicali-
ties of [section] 101(a)(2) litigation and state personal injury
limitations periods, we are bound to borrow state personal injury
statutes absent some compelling demonstration that "the federal
policies at stake" in [section] 101(a)(2) actions make a federal limi-
tations period "a significantly more appropriate vehicle for intersti-
tial lawmaking.' 177
170. Reed, 488 U.S. at 327.
171. Id.
172. Id at 330 (quoting DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S.
151, 171 (1983) (quoting United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 70 (1981)
(Stewart, J., concurring in judgment))).
173. Id. at 333.
174. Id. at 333 n.7.
175. See id. at 331-32. The Court did not embark on an analysis to determine which
state's personal injury action applied. It simply reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision
applying the NLRA's six-month statute of limitations. Id. at 334. The District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina had applied that state's three-year limita-
tions period for personal injury actions. Id. at 322-33. Because the union-defendant
was a local chapter of the United Transportation Union, see id. at 321-22, all relevant
events presumably occurred in North Carolina, thus obviating the need to engage in a
choice of law analysis.
176. Id. at 327.
177. Id. (quoting DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172
(1983)).
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This statement suggests that the Court implicitly modified the DelCos-
tello framework by elevating the significance of the second condition
precedent while reducing the importance of the first condition. Even
if state law provides a closer analogy than any federal law (which it
did here), it appears that a federal court still has to invoke the excep-
tion and borrow from federal law if any of the "federal policies at
stake" are substantial enough to compel it to do so.
The Court then proceeded to analyze whether the federal policies at
stake in section 101(a)(2) actions make a federal limitations period a
significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking.178
The Court focused solely on whether state statutes of limitations sig-
nificantly interfere with the federal policy of promoting rapid resolu-
tion of labor disputes.'79 If adoption of a state limitations period were
to frustrate this policy, then borrowing from the NLRA-the federal
legislation governing the relationship between labor and manage-
ment-certainly would be more appropriate.
The Court conceded that "interests in stable bargaining relation-
ships and in private dispute resolution under collective-bargaining
agreements are implicated by section 101(a)(2) claims."'180 It con-
cluded, however, that the relationship is only "tangential and re-
mote."' 8' It reasoned that section 101(a)(2) claims only involve
internal union disputes. 82 Such claims do not challenge the relation-
ship between the employer and the union nor do they affect " 'any
interpretation or effect [sic] any reinterpretation of the collective bar-
gaining agreement .. . "'183 Consequently, state limitations periods
do not frustrate or interfere with the federal interests in collective bar-
gaining and the quick resolution of labor disputes.'" Thus, the Court
borrowed from state law."8
III. DIFFERENT ANALYSES UTILIZED BY CIRCUIT COURTS TO
SUPPLY WARN WITH A LIMITATIONS PERIOD
Currently, four circuit courts of appeals have addressed the issue of
what statute of limitations applies to WARN cases. Two circuits favor
state borrowing;8 6 the other two favor federal borrowing.'87
178. Id at 327-31.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 330.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 331.
183. Id. (quoting Doty v. Sewall, 784 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1986)).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 334.
186. See United Steelworkers v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 32 F.3d 53, 61 (3d Cir.
1994), cert. granted, 63 U.S.L.W. 3514 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1995) (No. 94-834); United
Paperworkers Local 340 v. Specialty Paperboard, 999 F.2d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 1993).
187. See United Mine Workers v. Peabody Coal Co., 38 F.3d 850, 856 (6th Cir.
1994); Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp., 31 F.3d 224, 241 (5th Cir. 1994).
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Despite these differing preferences between the circuits, one should
be careful before categorizing the scenario as a circuit court "split."
Each circuit applied some form of the DelCostello framework"as in
deciding whether to invoke the exception and borrow a statute of limi-
tations from federal law.' 89 Under DelCostello, a court may adopt a
federal limitations period only when two conditions precedent are
present.190 The first condition is that a federal statute of limitations
clearly provides a closer analogy than available state alternatives. 191
When a claim is multistate in nature, that is, the plaintiff commences
the suit in a state not containing the alleged violation, 192 the court
must determine which state's law will provide the state law alterna-
tives before it can make this determination. 9 3 The circuits utilize sev-
eral different methods to make this determination, 194 and under each
method, the law of the forum state plays a prominent role. 195 Thus,
deciding whether to invoke the exception to the state-borrowing doc-
trine hinges in part upon which state provides the forum for the
WARN action. Because several states comprise each circuit,' 96 it is
conceivable that the circuits that have already supplied WARN claims
with a statute of limitations may have reached different outcomes had
the suit originated in another state.
A. Circuits that Refused to Borrow the NLRA's Six-Month Statute
of Limitations
The Second Circuit, in United Paperworkers Local 340 v. Specialty
Paperboard, Inc., 9 was the first circuit to determine which statute of
limitations courts should apply to WARN claims.198 In that case, the
defendant, Specialty Paperboard Inc., sold its paper mill in Vermont
to Rock-Tenn Co. ("RTC") on March 15, 1991.199 The defendant laid
188. Reed only modified the basic DelCostello framework by reducing the impor-
tance of the second condition. Whereas DelCostello suggested that both conditions
must be present before invoking the exception, Reed implied that the federal policies
may still require a court to invoke the exception even if state law provided a closer
analogy. See supra notes 159-85 and accompanying text.
189. See infra notes 197-330 and accompanying text.
190. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171-72 (1983).
191. Id.
192. WARN permits suits in potentially numerous jurisdictions. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 2104(a)(5) (1988) ("A person seeking to enforce such liability... may sue ... in any
district court of the United States for any district in which the violation is alleged to
have occurred, or in which the employer transacts business.") (emphasis added).
193. Norwood, supra note 13, at 480.
194. Id.
195. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
196. Harry W. Jones et al., Legal Method: Cases and Text Materials 45-46 (2d ed.
1980).
197. 999 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1993).
198. L. at 54 (noting, however, that several district courts had already addressed
the issue).
199. Id at 52.
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off all of its 232 employees.2° That same day, RTC rehired 141 of
these employees. 20 1 One year later, the employees' union brought suit
on behalf of the laid off employees under WARN, alleging failure to
provide notice of the impending layoff.2° Defendants moved to dis-
miss the claim as time barred, claiming that the NLRA's six-month
statute of limitation is applicable.2 °3
The court concluded that the NLRA's six-month statute of limita-
tions is not analogous to WARN.2 4 It provided two reasons to sup-
port this conclusion.
First, the two statutes have different purposes.2 5 The NLRA's pur-
pose is to protect the rights of workers to unionize and collectively
bargain with their employers. ° WARN's purpose, on the other hand,
is to mitigate the distress caused by unexpected layoffs for both union
and nonunion workers and their communities. 2° The court noted that
WARN "'neither encourage[s] nor discourage[s] ... collective bar-
gaining'" because when a WARN cause of action accrues, the em-
ployer-employee relationship already had been terminated for at least
six months. 0 8
Second, the NLRA has an administrative structure that helps work-
ers protect their statutory rights, thus justifying a short limitations pe-
riod.20 9 Under the NLRA, an aggrieved party (either the workers or
the union) files a charge with the Board, and the Board prosecutes the
case, if in its discretion it chooses to do so. 210 WARN has no such
structure; the workers or union must sue independently. 21' Because
the plaintiffs in a WARN claim must institute their own actions, the
court implied that a longer limitations period is favorable.21 '2
For these two reasons, the court concluded that the NLRA does not
provide a "much closer analogy to WARN than any state statute.) 213
The court made this statement before analyzing any state law alterna-
tive.214 Presumably, the court reasoned that the dissimilarities be-
tween WARN and the NLRA are so extensive that the NLRA could
never be a closer analogy than any state law.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 54-55.
205. Id. at 54.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 54-55 (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 20-21
(1986) (citation omitted)).
209. Id. at 55.
210. Id.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. Id. (emphasis added).
214. See id. at 54-57.
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Ultimately, however, the court concluded that Vermont's contract
statute of limitations215 possesses sufficient similarities with WARN,
thus providing a closer analogy than the NLRA.216 In Vermont,
claims for workers' compensation benefits are subject to the state's
contract limitations period,217 and like a WARN claim, workers' com-
pensation suits are intended to protect employees from unexpected
unemployment.2 18
The court then addressed whether the federal policies at stake and
the practicalities of litigation render the application of state law prob-
lematic.21 9 It concluded that these concerns are not substantial. 20
The court reasoned that WARN does not undermine the federal regu-
latory scheme for collective bargaining because a plaintiff brings a
WARN claim, by definition, only after the employer-employee rela-
tionship had been terminated at least six months earlier 221 The court
also stated that the potential to forum shop under WARN is mini-
mal.' Even though an aggrieved employee may bring suit where the
site of the layoff occurred or where the employer does business,
choice of law rules would likely dictate borrowing the law of the state
where the site of the layoff occurred regardless of where the plaintiff
commences suit.22
In United Steelworkers v. Crown Cork & Seal Co.,224 the Third Cir-
cuit also refused to borrow the NLRA's statute of limitations.'2s In-
stead, it borrowed a limitations period from state law'2 and in many
ways imitated the Second Circuit's reasoning in Specialty Paperboard.
215. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 511 (1973).
216. Specialty Paperboard, 999 F.2d at 57. The court only considered Vermont law,
presumably because all relevant events occurred in that state. Id. The alleged WARN
violation took place in Vermont, and the plaintiff, a local Vermont chapter of the
United Paperworkers International Union, commenced the suit there as well. Id. at
52. Furthermore, although not clear from the Second Circuit's decision, the district
court's opinion noted that the plaintiffs only argued that Vermont's six-year contract
statute of limitations applied. United Paperworkers Local No. 340 v. Specialty Paper-
board, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 671, 673 (D. Vt. 1992).
217. Specialty Paperboard, 999 F.2d at 57; see Hartman v. Ouellette Plumbing &
Heating Corp., 507 A.2d 952,953 (Vt. 1985); Fitch v. Parks & Woolson Mach. Co., 191
A. 920, 922 (Vt. 1937).
218. Specialty Paperboard, 999 F.2d at 57.
219. Id. at 56.
220. Id
221. Id at 55.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 56 n.9. Choice of law rules, however, do not support this proposition.
Because the federal circuits do not follow uniform choice of law principles regarding
federal question cases, it is quite conceivable that one court may borrow from State A
while another court, with the same set of facts, may borrow from State B. See supra
notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
224. 32 F.3d 53 (3d Cir. 1994), cert granted, 63 U.S.L.W. 3514 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1995)
(No. 94-834).
225. See id. at 61.
226. Id
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In Crown Cork, an employer terminated eighty-five employees at
its Georgia plant on September 30, 1991.2 7 Approximately twelve
months later, the union filed a complaint, alleging that the employer
failed to comply with WARN's requirements for notice.2 8 The em-
ployer argued that the NLRA's six-month statute of limitations pro-
vides the most applicable limitations period, and thus, the claim
should be time barred.229
The court concluded that the NLRA is not a satisfactory alternative
to WARN. 3 As in Specialty Paperboard, the court compared the
statutes' purposes 31 and determined that any effects WARN has on
collective bargaining are "tangential at best."23  Furthermore,
WARN has the broader purpose of also protecting communities from
any "potentially harmful employment decisions" that may occur
within it, 33 whereas the NLRA simply addresses the employer-em-
ployee relationship.2 4
The court failed to analyze whether any state law alternative pro-
vides an adequate analogy to WARN. It merely suggested that the
difference between WARN and the NLRA is so great that the NLRA
could never serve as a closer analogy than any state alternatives, even
though the state alternative may also be a poor substitute?3 5
The court then examined the federal policies at stake and the practi-
calities of litigation,z 6 concluding that the NLRA's statute of limita-
tions is not a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial
lawmaking. 7 First, the court reasoned that WARN claims present no
pressing need for a uniform statute of limitations.38 Uniformity
would be necessary if WARN contained numerous legal theories, be-
cause a cause of action arising under the statute could encompass
more than one theory. 9 If the limitations period depended upon the
227. Id. at 56.
228. Id.
229. Id In an accompanying case, an employer, on February 25, 1991, laid off 270
of its employees. Id. at 55. On September 9, 1991, the union filed a complaint against
the employer, alleging WARN violations. Id. The employer did not raise the statute
of limitations defense. Id. The district court granted the union's summary judgment
motion. Id Sometime thereafter, the nonunionized employees sued the employer
under WARN. Id. at 55-56. The employer raised the statute of limitations defense,
arguing the NLRA's six-month limitation period applied. Id. at 56.
230. See id. at 58-61.
231. Id. at 57-58.
232. Id. at 58.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See id. at 61 ("While we acknowledge that none of the possible state laws
provide perfect analogies to WARN, the absence of a perfect analogy is an insuffi-
cient reason to depart from the general rule, particularly when federal law does not
provide a satisfactory alternative.").
236. Id. at 60-61.
237. See id.
238. Id. at 59-60.
239. See id.
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precise legal theory of each claim, more than one statute of limitations
potentially could apply to each claim.' a Because WARN contains a
single cause of action, the court concluded that uniformity concerns
are not implicated."A Second, the court asserted that affected em-
ployees would not significantly benefit from forum shopping because
choice of law rules generally require applying the state's law where
the site of injury occurred.242 Third, the court observed that a WARN
cause of action requires a longer limitation period than six months.
4 3
A short statute of limitations is acceptable under the NLRA because
the NLRB, not the complainants, prosecutes the claim,-" WARN has
no such administrative framework; the employees must sue directly.-
A5
Consequently, six months may not provide affected employees suffi-
cient time to sue.246 Finally, none of the potential state limitation pe-
riods interfere with federal policy.24 7 The court reasoned that none of
the state statutes of limitations are so short as to interfere with the
employees' ability to vindicate their rights.' s In addition, given
WARN's limited effect on collective bargaining, a short statute of
limitations is unnecessary to promote rapid resolutions of labor
disputes.249
Thus, the court refused to invoke the exception and to apply the
NLRA's six-month statute of limitations to WARN claims.250 Instead,
it borrowed a limitations period from state law.251 The court, how-
ever, declined to decide specifically which statute's limitations period
240. Id.
241. Id. at 60.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 60-61.
244. Id. at 60.
245. Id. at 60-61.
246. Id. at 61.
247. Id. The state alternatives brought to the lower court's attention included the
two-year period for enforcing civil penalties under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(5)
(Supp. 1994), the four-year limitations period for breach of an implied contract, 42 Pa.
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5525(4) (1981), Pennsylvania's six-year residual statute of limita-
tions, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5527 (Supp. 1994), and the three-year period applica-
ble to Pennsylvania's Wage Payment and Collection Law, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43,
§ 260.9a(g) (1992). Crown Cork, 32 F.3d at 61, 61 n.5.
248. Id. at 61.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. Because one of the actions joined for appeal occurred in Georgia and the
other in Pennsylvania, an issue arose regarding whether Georgia or Pennsylvania law
should supply the statute of limitations. Id. at 60 n.4. The court noted that "'the
governing statute of limitations should be that of the state in which the federal court
sits, unless a party can make a compelling showing that the application of that statu-
tory time bar would seriously frustrate federal labor policy or work severe hardship to
the litigants."' Id. (quoting Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Assoc.,
602 F.2d 494, 507-08 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 448 U.S. 902 (1980)).
The court declined to decide whether it should borrow from Georgia or Pennsylvania
law because no party argued for a statute of limitations from either state under which
either of the actions would have been untimely. Id.
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applies because the WARN claims would have been timely under any
of the possible state limitation periods that the parties brought to the
court's attention. 52
Although the Second and Third Circuits cited DelCostello in their
opinions, a careful reading of the Specialty Paperboard and Crown
Cork decisions illustrates that these courts in fact applied the modified
DelCostello framework used in Reed. Under the original DelCostello
approach, both conditions must exist before a court may invoke the
exception to the general rule,z 3 and both circuits determined that the
NLRA is not a closer analogy to WARN than any state law alterna-
tive.254 Had these courts utilized the original DelCostello framework,
they need not have addressed the second condition; they simply
should have applied a state statute of limitations. Both circuits, how-
ever, still attempted to determine whether federal policies compel
borrowing the NLRA's limitations period.5 By continuing in this
manner, these courts suggested that the federal policies at stake might
still require federal borrowing even though state law provides the
closer analogy. Thus, similar to the Supreme Court's actions in Reed,
the Second and Third Circuits implicitly reduced the importance of
the first condition while elevating the importance of the second.
B. Circuits that Borrowed the NLRA's Six-Month Statute of
Limitations
The Fifth Circuit, in Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp., 56 diverged
from the Second and Third Circuits and borrowed the NLRA's six-
month statute of limitations for WARN claims 57 In Halkias, the De-
partment of Defense canceled a contract with the employer, General
Dynamics, on January 7, 1991.5 Because of the cancellation, Gen-
eral Dynamics instituted a "mass layoff" the following day at three of
its facilities in three different states: Texas, Oklahoma, and Mis-
souri?5 9 Twenty-two months later, two thousand former nonunion
employees from the facilities in Texas and Oklahoma filed WARN
suits against General Dynamics in the Western District of Texas.2 60
The employer argued that the claims were time barred because the
NLRA's six-month statute of limitations is applicable to WARN
cases.
2 61
252. Id.
253. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171-72 (1982).
254. See supra notes 204-18, 230-35 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 219-23, 236-49 and accompanying text.
256. 31 F.3d 224 (5th Cir. 1994).
257. Id. at 228.
258. Id. at 227.
259. Id. For WARN's definition of "mass layoff," see supra note 4.
260. Halkias, 31 F.3d at 227.
261. Id. In another case consolidated for appeal, the employer, Glastron, allegedly
laid off over 250 employees in its Texas facility between October 31 and December 31,
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The court utilized DelCostello's general outline in deciding to adopt
the NLRA's statute of limitations.262 It first addressed whether the
NLRA is more analogous than any available state alternatives. 263 It
noted the many similarities between the NLRA and WARNa64-
namely that both statutes share similar, although not identical, pur-
poses265 and that both seek to protect workers by restricting employer
activities.2' The NLRA protects the rights of workers to join and
collectively bargain by placing "'certain enumerated restrictions on
the activities of employers.' "267 WARN protects from the devastating
impact of a sudden layoff by preventing employers from curtailing or
closing an operation without giving sixty-days notice?56 Thus, the
court observed that the NLRA regulates the general relationship be-
tween employer and employee and WARN regulates this relationship
in a specific instance 269 In addition, both statutes share a linguistic
overlap:270 "[T]he Department of Labor borrowed extensively from
the NLRA in promulgating regulations for WARN."" After
WARN's enactment, the NLRB's General Counsel even "'predicted
substantial interplay between... [(WARN)] ... and the nation's basic
labor law administered by the NLRB.' "272 Indeed, given this exten-
sive borrowing from the NLRA, courts have often utilized the NLRA
case law in interpreting WARN.273
Furthermore, the court characterized WARN as an "outgrowth" of
the NLRA.274 The NLRA requires employers to bargain over the ef-
1990. Id. at 228. On December 17, 1992, the plaintiff filed suit against the employer.
Id. The employer argued that the action was barred by the limitations period that
should be borrowed from the NLRA. Id.
262. Id. at 230.
263. Id. The court only considered limitations periods from the law of the forum
state, Texas, because no party, even the plaintiffs from Oklahoma, suggested borrow-
ing from an Oklahoma period. Id at 234 n.19.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 231.
266. Id
267. Id (quoting American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965)).
268. Id
269. Id. at 233-34.
270. Id. at 231-32.
271. Id at 231; see, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(d) (1994) (defining "representative" for
WARN purposes by explicit reference to §§ 9(a) and 8(f) of the NLRA); 20 C.F.R.
§ 639.3(a)(1)(ii) (1994) (defining "reasonable expectation of recall"); 20 C.F.Rt
§ 639.3(a)(2) (1994) (defining "independent contractors and subsidiaries" by refer-
ence to "existing legal rules," that is, case law interpreting the NLRA).
272. Halkias, 31 F.3d at 231-32 (quoting NLRB General Counsel Outlines Overlap
Between Plant Closing Law and Taft-Hartley, 226 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Nov. 23,
1988, at A-3) (brackets in original)).
273. Id; see, e.g., Damron v. Rob Fork Mining Corp., 739 F. Supp. 341, 344 (E.D.
Ky. 1990) (determining whether an employee would "reasonably experience an em-
ployment loss" by referring to the National Labor Relations Board's use of the "rea-
sonable expectation of recall" test), aff'd, 945 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1991).
274. Halkias, 31 F.3d at 232.
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fects on employees of a decision to close a plant.275 To meet this obli-
gation, employers must provide unions with adequate notice for
unions to have a meaningful opportunity to bargain.2 76 "In a sense,
WARN amends the NLRA by setting a specific time period for notice,
in addition to expanding coverage to all employees, regardless of
union status."2 77
Finally, because collective bargaining agreements ordinarily contain
provisions requiring notice before mass layoffs and shutdowns,
"WARN merely codifies a frequent practice facilitated by the
NLRA."278 The Department of Labor's regulations also "inject[ ]
WARN into collective bargaining agreements" in two additional
ways.279 First, the regulations provide that WARN's notice period au-
tomatically increases if the collective bargaining agreement requires a
notice period of longer than sixty days. 80 Second, the regulations
permit WARN to clarify or amplify the "terms and conditions" of the
agreement.8 1
The Halkias court then compared WARN to the state alternatives
brought to its attention,' including Texas' tort statute, 3 residual
statute of limitations,2 4 and contract statute. 8 5 It rejected the notion
that a WARN claim is similar to the tort of "conversion of an em-
ployee's right to continued employment. ' '2 6 The court reasoned that
WARN has nothing to do with a right to continued employment; it is
only concerned with employers providing notice in certain in-
stances.' s "Regardless of whether notice is given, the employer is
[still] free to terminate.. . the employee. . . ."m The court quickly
dismissed the state's residual statute, stating that borrowing a catchall
limitations period is a disfavored practice.8 9 Finally, the court re-
jected the notion that a WARN claim is similar to a breach of contract
275. See id. (citing Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 1983)).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 233.
280. Id. at 232.
281. Id. at 233.
282. Id. at 234.
283. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003 (West 1986).
284. Id. § 16.051.
285. Id. § 16.004.
286. Halkias, 31 F.3d at 235.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. In stating this proposition, the court cited Agency Holding Corp. v. Mal-
ley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987). In Agency Holding, the Court refused to
apply a state's catchall statute of limitations to a federal cause of action. Id. at 152-53.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that it is unlikely Congress intended
such a limitations period to apply to the right it had created. Id.
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claim.29 Once again, the court noted that WARN is unrelated to the
contractual right to continued employment.291
After comparing WARN to the NLRA and the available state alter-
natives, the court concluded that the NLRA provides the closer anal-
ogy.292 Under the DelCostello framework, however, before a court
may borrow the NLRA's statute of limitations, the federal policies at
stake and the practicalities of litigation must make the NLRA's rule a
significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking z3
Addressing this issue, the court concluded that the NLRA does pro-
vide a more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking.' The
court first observed that borrowing a state statute of limitations
presents troublesome litigation practicalities because such borrowing
poses the risk of forum shopping.2 9 WARN permits a plaintiff to
bring an action not only in any district in which the violation allegedly
occurred, but also in any district in which the employer conducts busi-
ness.296 Thus, affected employees likely will have the opportunity to
commence a suit in a forum that does not include the site of the
WARN violation. Because forum possibilities potentially may span
more than one state, a conflict would arise as to which state's statute
of limitations applies.29 The court noted that in federal question
cases arising in the Fifth Circuit, conflict of law principles derive from
federal common law.298 The district court, however, may follow the
forum state's choice of law rules as a surrogate for federal common
law.299 Because many states regard statutes of limitations as proce-
dural, a federal court following that state's choice of law principles
must necessarily apply that forum's limitation period, even though the
WARN violation did not occur in that state.'o Because plaintiffs may
have numerous options regarding where to commence a WARN suit,
the potential to forum shop is quite real. In addition to forum shop-
ping, the possibility of multistate WARN litigation, especially in class
actions, also requires time-consuming litigation regarding which
state's limitations period would be applicable?"01
The Halkias court then reasoned that state borrowing would dis-
serve important federal policies.302 Congress, in enacting a six-month
statute of limitations for NLRA claims, sought to "bar litigation over
290. Halklas, 31 F.3d at 235.
291. 1i
292. Id. at 235-36.
293. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983).
294. Halkias, 31 F.3d at 236.
295. Id.
296. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5) (1988)).
297. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 1 (1969).
298. Halkias, 31 F.3d at 236-37.
299. Id. at 237.
300. I1&
301. Id. at 237-38.
302. See id. at 238.
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past events after records have been destroyed, witnesses have gone
elsewhere, and recollection of the events in question have become dim
and confused.""3 3 The court stated that these availability-of-evidence
concerns are no less applicable to WARN claims.3" Furthermore, the
court observed that application of state limitations periods, which can
be several years in length, disserves WARN's "most specific objective:
the provision of a cushion of time for employees to explore other job
opportunities and, if necessary, seek retraining.... [P]roviding funds
to workers several years after their termination does not serve that
objective. '3o5
Parenthetically, the court rejected the argument that six months is
too short a period of time for an employee to bring suit.3 6 It rea-
soned that the Supreme Court in DelCostello adopted the six-month
provision for hybrid section 301 actions against the employer's union
for breach of the duty of fair representation (and against the employer
for breach of the collective bargaining agreement).3°7 Despite the em-
ployee's lack of sophistication, the Supreme Court held that six
months provides sufficient time to bring suit.30 8 Because the hybrid
cause of action is just as complex as, if not more complex than, a
WARN claim, the court here suggested that six months is an adequate
period for WARN plaintiffs to commence their claims.30 9
The Sixth Circuit, in United Mine Workers v. Peabody Coal Co.,310
soon joined the Fifth Circuit in holding that the NLRA's six-month
statute of limitations provides the more analogous limitations provi-
sion and better effectuates WARN policies than state law alterna-
tives.311 Here, the defendant operated a coal mining facility in
Kentucky.312 On June 3, 1991, the Kentucky Department of Natural
Resources ordered the defendant to stop blasting at the mine.313 The
defendant obeyed this order and, as a result, laid off eighty-two mine
employees by June 28, 1991. 311 On May 15, 1992, the plaintiff filed
suit in federal court, alleging WARN violations.31 5 The defendant
filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiff's
claim was untimely because the NLRA's six-month statute of limita-
tions applies.316
303. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
304. Id.
305. Id. at 239.
306. Id. at 238 n.35.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See id.
310. 38 F.3d 850 (6th Cir. 1994).
311. Id. at 855-56.
312. Id. at 851.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
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From Supreme Court cases following DelCostello, the court gleaned
a three-prong analysis for determining whether to borrow a statute of
limitations from federal law instead of state law."1 7 Under this test,
borrowing is indicated when "uniformity [is] desirable[,J ... federal
law provide[s] a much clearer analogy than state law[, and] ... federal
law significantly and directly advance[s] the policy underlying the stat-
ute in a way that state law does not." '318
Because of the "multi-state nature of decisions that implicate
WARN," the Court concluded that a uniform statute of limitations,
rather than the nonuniformity caused by state borrowing, is "highly
desirable."3 19 Otherwise, WARN would create "limitless" opportuni-
ties to forum shop because it authorizes commencement of suits in
"any federal district 'in which the employer transacts business,'...
including districts other than where a plant is closed or the plant clos-
ing decision was made." 3" In addition, it noted that courts may have
to confront "potentially daunting choice of law problems arising from
claims brought in several different states as a result of forum shop-
ping."32 It also reasoned that an employer who decided to shut down
operations in several states could possibly be sued in all those states
and thus be subject to several different statutes of limitations for the
same, single federal violation.3"
317. Id. at 855.
318. 1d. The court here added the "uniformity" inquiry to the DelCostello frame-
work. The court gleaned this inquiry from Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff &
Assoc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987). See Peabody Coal, 38 F.3d at 853-55. In Agency Holding,
an insurance company, on February 13, 1978, terminated the plaintiff's agency for
failing to meet a production quota. Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 145. On March
20, 1981, plaintiff brought suit against defendant. Id. He alleged causes of action
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985 (1988), stemming from the termination. Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at
145. Congress failed to provide a limitations period for RICO claims. Id. at 146. In
concluding that the Clayton Act's four-year statute of limitations, 15 U.S.C. § 15b
(1988), is applicable to RICO claims, the Court stated that a uniform statute of limita-
tions period is desirable. Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 154. The predicate acts
that may establish a civil RICO claim often will occur in several states, thus creating
the possibility of multiple state limitation periods. Id. Because of this possibility, "the
use of state statutes would present the danger of forum shopping and ... would 'virtu-
ally guarante[e] ... complex and expensive litigation over what should be a straight-
forward matter.'" Id (quoting Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the
ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law 392 (1985)).
Practically, however, this "new" layer has no effect on the DelCostello framework
because the desire for uniformity is essentially a subcomponent to DelCostello's sec-
ond condition. Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp., 31 F.3d 224, 230 (5th Cir. 1994).
For simplicity's sake, this Note presents the Sixth Circuit's analysis in the framework
that court followed.
319. Peabody Coal, 38 F.3d at 855.
320. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5) (1988)).
321. Id.
322. Id.
1995] 1453
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Regarding the second prong, the court concluded that the NLRA
provides a closer analogy to WARN than any state law alternative.3
It observed that both WARN and the NLRA protect employees
against unemployment. 324 It also stated that the NLRA's purpose to
regulate management activities "'which affect commerce and are in-
imical to the general welfare' is consistent with WARN's purpose of
protecting both workers and their communities as well.325 It addition-
ally pointed to WARN's references to the NLRA as another similarity
between the two legislations.326
Comparing WARN to Kentucky's five-year catchall limitations pe-
riod applicable to all statutory claims, the court concluded that the
state alternative "in essence provides no analogy.... The only com-
monality between WARN and the proffered state statute is that both
are pieces of legislation. 327
Under the third prong, the court concluded that the NLRA's six-
month statute of limitations furthers the policies underlying WARN in
a way that the state's five-year alternative could not.32 The court ob-
served that Congress, in passing WARN, intended only to provide
short-term assistance to employees, their communities, and state
agencies. 32 9 A long limitations period "would do nothing to achieve
WARN's aim of starting employees on the road to retraining and re-
employment before unemployment becomes a problem.
330
When reading Halkias and Peabody, it is not clear whether the Fifth
and Sixth Circuits were implicitly applying the modified DelCostello
framework used in Reed. By first determining whether the NLRA is
WARN's closest analogue and then addressing whether federal poli-
cies require borrowing from the NLRA, it appears, at first glance, that
these circuits followed the original DelCostello framework. Because
these courts, however, concluded that the NLRA provides the closer
analogy than state law, one still does not know if the these courts
would still have borrowed from the NLRA had state law provided the
closer alternative. Thus, one cannot infer whether these circuits incor-
porated Reed's modification into their analyses.
323. Id. at 856. The court only considered Kentucky's residual statute of limita-
tions, presumably because it was the only alternative the plaintiff proffered. Id. at 851.
324. Id.
325. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1988)).
326. id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
[Vol. 631454
THE WARN ACT
IV. FEDERAL COURTS SHOULD APPLY THE NLRA'S SiX-MoNTH
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO WARN CLAIMS
As discussed above, when Congress created a federal right without
prescribing a period for enforcement, courts generally have borrowed
a limitations period from state law. Recently, in DelCostello, the
Supreme Court created an exception to this general rule.331 Federal
courts may diverge from state law and borrow from federal law, pro-
vided that a federal law rule clearly provides a closer analogy than
available state statutes, and that the federal policies at stake and the
practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropri-
ate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking.332
In Reed, the Supreme Court revisited this exception.333 A close
reading of this decision illustrates that the Court modified the DelCos-
tello framework by elevating the importance of federal policies in the
analysis. Reed implied that the federal policies at stake might still re-
quire borrowing from a federal statute even when state law provides
the more analogous statute of limitations. Indeed, when federal poli-
cies and litigation practicalities are so compelling (as they are in
WARN cases), federal courts should not waste valuable time and re-
sources even addressing the question of which state's limitations pe-
riod should govern. Instead, the courts should apply the NLRA's six-
month statute of limitations to WARN claims.
Some circuits argue that federal policies and litigation practicalities
do not make the NLRA's limitations period a better vehicle for inter-
stitial lawmaking. These proponents of state borrowing offer several
arguments to support this position. They first contend that the poten-
tial for forum shopping under WARN is minimal. Even though
WARN permits the commencement of the suit not only in the district
where the violation is alleged to have occurred but also where the
employer does business,334 these opponents argue that choice of law
rules would likely dictate borrowing the law of the site of the layoff
regardless of where the plaintiff commences suit. Choice of law rules,
however, do not support this proposition. Because WARN contains a
generous forum provision,335 affected employees will likely have the
opportunity to commence a suit in a state that does not include the
site of the WARN violation. When a plaintiff brings a claim in a state
not containing the alleged violation, the court must determine which
state's law will provide the alternative that it will compare to the fed-
eral option. 336 The circuits utilize several different methods to make
331. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983).
332. Id.
333. Reed v. United Transportation Union, 488 U.S. 319 (1989).
334. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5) (1988).
335. Id.
336. Norwood, supra note 13, at 480-81.
1995] 1455
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
this determination,337 and in adhering to any particular method, some
courts may be required to apply a limitations period from the forum
state, even if the WARN violation did not occur in that state.338 Thus,
the potential to forum shop clearly exists.
Another argument against borrowing from the NLRA is that
WARN claims present no pressing need for a uniform statute of limi-
tations. Proponents of state borrowing concede that uniformity would
be necessary if WARN contained numerous legal theories because a
cause of action arising under the statute could quite conceivably en-
compass more than one of these theories; if the limitations period de-
pended upon the precise theory of each claim, more than one statute
of limitations could potentially apply to each claim. Because WARN
contains a single cause of action, proponents of state borrowing con-
clude such borrowing does not implicate uniformity concerns.
Admittedly, WARN contains only one type of action. This argu-
ment, however, fails to recognize that uniformity is desirable for other
reasons as well, most notably to avoid the potential to forum shop.
Nonuniformity also results in "two or more plaintiffs.., suing under
the identical federal statutory claim ... [possibly] end[ing] up with
different lengths of time within which to pursue their actions. This
time differential directly impacts perceptions of fairness in the federal
judicial system. ''3 39 In addition, in multistate WARN litigation, bor-
rowing statutes of limitations from state law requires time-consuming
and expensive litigation concerning what state's limitations period is
applicable. Furthermore, predictability, a primary goal of statutes of
limitations,34 is frustrated by the nonuniformity that state borrowing
creates. As noted earlier, the forum state plays a critical role in deter-
mining which state's law supplies the limitations period for WARN
claims.341 Because plaintiffs may often have several options regarding
where to commence a WARN suit, the employer frequently will be
uncertain when an action becomes time barred.
Further, opponents to borrowing the NLRA's statute of limitations
argue that a WARN cause of action requires a longer limitation pe-
riod than six months. A short statute of limitations is acceptable for
the NLRA because the NLRB prosecutes claims arising under the
NLRA. An employee pursuing a WARN claim, on the other hand,
must prosecute the suit individually. This argument overlooks the fact
that the Supreme Court in DelCostello adopted the NLRA's six-
month provision for hybrid section 301 actions against unions for
breach of its duty of fair representation and against the employer for
337. Id. at 481; see also supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
339. Norwood, supra note 13, at 487.
340. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 240 (1989).
341. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
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breach of the collective bargaining agreement. 32 Like WARN claims,
employees must pursue hybrid section 301 claims individually.3 3 De-
spite this fact, the Court still held that six months is sufficient time to
bring suit.' DelCostello's holding belies the argument that employ-
ees who must pursue their claims individually need a longer statute of
limitations.
The argument that WARN requires a longer statute of limitations
also neglects to consider Congress' purpose in passing WARN. By
enacting WARN, Congress intended to provide short-term assistance
to employees, their communities, and local governments to accelerate
retraining, relocation, and reemployment. 341 To achieve this purpose,
it is important that workers claim and receive this relief promptly after
discharge. A limitation period permitting a worker to recover on a
WARN claim several years after the violation obviously fails to fur-
ther this objective.
Proponents of state borrowing also maintain that the NLRA is a
poor analogy to WARN. In particular, they point to differing pur-
poses between the statutes. The NLRA's general purpose is to pro-
tect the rights of workers to unionize and collectively bargain with
their employers, whereas WARN's purpose is to provide transition
time to adjust to the prospective loss of employment. As noted above,
however, Reed essentially reduced the importance of this inquiry
when determining whether to invoke the exception to the general
rule. Reed suggested that even if the NLRA was a poor analogy to
WARN, the federal policies at stake and litigation practicalities might
still be compelling enough to require federal-borrowing.
Indeed, in WARN actions, the federal policies and litigation practi-
calities are so compelling that federal courts should not waste valuable
time and resources even attempting to determine which state's limita-
tions period should govern WARN. WARN's fundamental purpose is
to provide short-term assistance to displaced workers.? To accom-
plish this objective, it is imperative that displaced employees obtain
this relief as soon as possible. Many state limitation periods, however,
are several years in length.347 Borrowing a limitation from state law is
obviously inconsistent with WARN's basic objective. In addition,
state borrowing results in federal courts applying nonuniform limita-
tion periods to WARN suits. This nonuniformity leads to inefficient
allocation of judicial resources, unfairness in the federal judicial sys-
tem, and, most importantly, the potential to forum shop. Borrowing
342. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983).
343. See id. at 155 (noting that the plaintiff initiated the action).
344. Id at 172.
345. See 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(a) (1994).
346. Id. § 639.1(a).
347. See, e.g., Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 260.9a(g) (1992) (three years); Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 12, § 511 (1973) (six years).
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the NLRA's six-month statute of limitations provides a uniform limi-
tations period for all WARN claims and furthers WARN's purpose of
providing only short-term relief to displaced workers.
Despite Reed, although WARN and the NLRA admittedly possess
somewhat different purposes, significant interrelationships and simi-
larities exist between the legislations. First, the Department of La-
bor's regulations implementing WARN stipulate that the WARN
notice shall automatically increase if the collective bargaining agree-
ment so provides. The regulations also permit WARN to clarify the
"terms and conditions" of the collective bargaining agreement. 348 In
fact, the Department of Labor "borrowed extensively"3 49 from the
NLRA when issuing WARN's regulations, and because of this exten-
sive borrowing, courts have often referred to NLRA case law in inter-
preting WARN.35 0 Second, one may even view WARN as a
clarification of the NLRA. The NLRA requires an employer to bar-
gain in good faith with the union regarding the effects of a decision to
close a plant.35' To satisfy this duty, employers must notify the union
prior to the closing so that the union has a meaningful opportunity to
bargain.352 Courts, however, have declined to mandate a specific time
in advance by which employers must give notice.353 WARN, in es-
sence, sets a specific time period for notice and expands this protec-
tion to cover all employees regardless of union status. Third, both
statutes essentially seek to protect workers against unemployment by
restricting management decisions. Finally, the NLRA's objective of
proscribing management activities "which affect commerce and are in-
imical to the general welfare '354 is entirely consistent with WARN's
goal of protecting both workers and their communities.
CONCLUSION
Federal courts should apply the NLRA's six-month statute of limi-
tations to all WARN claims, regardless of what alternative state law
provides. WARN and the NLRA, although not perfectly analogous,
possess many similarities and interrelationships, indicating that select-
ing the NLRA's limitation period is a logical and obvious choice. In
addition, unlike state limitation periods, which may be several years in
length, the NLRA's statute of limitations better serves WARN's
objective of providing short-term assistance to workers and their com-
348. Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp., 31 F.3d 224, 233 (5th Cir. 1994).
349. Id. at 231.
350. See, e.g., Damron v. Rob Fork Mining Corp., 739 F. Supp. 341, 344 (E.D. Ky.
1990) (determining whether an employee would "reasonably experience an employ-
ment loss" by referring to the NLRB's use of the "reasonable expectation of recall"
test), aff'd, 945 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1991).
351. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681 (1981).
352. Id.
353. Yost, supra note 33, at 684.
354. 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
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munities to accelerate retraining and employment. Furthermore, bor-
rowing from the NLRA results in a uniform limitation period for all
claims arising under WARN, thus curtailing the potential for forum
shopping and wasteful litigation, while also ensuring fairness in the
federal judicial system.

